People v. Bondurant Mental
Condition Negating Mens Rea
Facts: A jury convicted Mr. Bondurant of two counts of
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and a slew of other charges. Mr.
Bondurant sought to introduce evidence of his anxiety, depression, and panic
attacks to negate the mens rea of the
alleged crimes. However, Mr. Bondurant objected to the court appointed
evaluation required by statute.
Issue: Whether the statutes C.R.S. §16–8–107(3)(b), and
relevant portions of §16–8–103.6 and §16–8–106, requiring a state mental
evaluation violates the separation of powers doctrine, a defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to present a defense, the right to
effective assistance of counsel, or is unconstitutionally vague both on its face
and as applied?
Held: No.
Reasoning: Separation
of Powers: The Court of Appeals
ignored the argument that the statute set an additional condition precedent that
the judiciary's own rule did not impose. Mr. Bondurant argued that this usurped
the judiciary’s authority to set procedure. The Court of Appeals simply
disagreed.
Right to present a defense: The Court held the statute did not prohibit any
defense, but merely set procedure to pursue a defense.
Privilege against
self-incrimination: The Court
found, “Here, this statutory scheme evinces the General Assembly's intent that
information obtained in compulsory mental examinations be admissible only on
the issue of mental condition.” Hence, according to the Court, the statute does
not violate the 5th Amendment.
Effective assistance of counsel: The Court held, “Having concluded, consistently
with Roadcap, that the statutory
scheme does not preclude a defense involving the defendant's mental condition,
it necessarily follows that the statutory scheme does not violate a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel.” (Citing People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108 (Colo. App. 2003))
Unconstitutionally vague on its face
or as applied: The Court found the statute is not
incomprehensible in all its applications. Further, the term ‘cooperate’, the
Court reasoned, did not require folks of common intelligence to guess at its
meaning.
(panel: Judge Taubman wrote the decision and Judges Dailey and Fox concurred).
(panel: Judge Taubman wrote the decision and Judges Dailey and Fox concurred).
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