Facts: A Jury convicted Mr. Davis of distribution in one
case. In two other cases, he worked out a joint deal where he pled to drug
related offenses in each case. The prosecution then dismissed habitual criminal
charges against Mr. Davis. Prior to trial, Mr. Davis moved to represent
himself. No one disputed that Mr. Davis suffered some from serious mental
illness. During the pendency of his cases, the Court subjected Mr. Davis to
three competency evaluations, but Mr. Davis refused to participate in each.
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that Mr. Davis was competent to stand
trial. However, the trial court determined that Mr. Davis was not competent to
represent himself, and thus, denied his motion to dismiss counsel and proceed
pro se.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr.
Davis’ request to represent himself?
Held: No.
Reasoning:
In Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Indiana did not err when it denied Mr. Edwards’ request to represent
himself. The trial court in Indiana found Mr. Edwards competent to stand trial,
but also found his mental illness affected him to a degree that he could not
competently represent himself at trial.
Because the trial court that heard Mr. Davis’ request did not analyze
the issue under Edwards, the Court of
Appeals remanded this issue back to the trial court.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it declined to
address Mr. Davis’ desire to withdraw his two guilty pleas?
Held: Yes.
Reasoning:
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Davis
sought to withdraw his guilty pleas in his other two drug cases. His defense
lawyer declined to address the issue, and as a result, the trial court also
refused to address the issue. The Court of Appeals held that seeking to
withdraw a guilty plea is personal to the accused, and thus, a lawyer cannot
waive that issue. The Court of Appeals cited People v.
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 (2010) in support of its holding, and remanded the issue back to the trial court.
Issue: Whether the state violated Mr. Davis’ right under
the Double Jeopardy Clauses by convicting him of both possession and
distribution?
Held: No
Reasoning: First, there seems to be a trend among the
appellate divisions in Colorado to avoid any ‘unpreserved’ sentencing issues. Thus, like any trial error, if defense counsel
does not raise the sentencing issue to the trial court, the appellate divisions
seem eager to apply the deferential standard of ‘plain error’ on review. Here,
the Court of Appeals claimed that substitute counsel did not raise the issue of
Double Jeopardy at the time of sentencing, and thus, the standard of review the
Court held would be plain error. In deciding the issue, the Court found the
undercover officer’s testimony ambiguous. Thus, the Court concluded that the
jury could infer that Mr. Davis only handed the officer a portion of the total
amount of crack Mr. Davis possessed. Thus, the Court held, the two convictions
Mr. Davis suffered did not violate Double Jeopardy.
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