People v. Tucker    Attorney-Client  Privilege
Conviction Affirmed         
A jury  convicted Mr. Tucker of various fraud offenses. Mr. Tucker, a first year intern  with the DA's Office in Alamosa, sent a letter to his defense lawyer in Montana.  In Montana, the prosecution alleged that Mr. Tucker violated a restraining order  against his wife. Mr. Tucker, pretending to be the elected DA in Alamosa, wrote  a letter to his defense lawyer in Montana. The letter (hiliarious in form and  function) attacked the judge in Mr. Tucker's Montana criminal case with the  vigor and gusto of which only a stalking ex-husband is capable. Upon receipt of  the letter, Mr. Tucker's defense lawyer first called the judge's office, and  then forwarded the letter to the judge.  The lawyer claimed he was afraid for  the judge's safety. The lawyer also forwarded a copy of the letter to the actual  DA in Alamosa. The CofA found that the lawyer's action fall under fraud the  exception to the Attorney/Client privilege. Twice in two months the CofA handed  down opinions where the defense lawyers sold out their clients. Unfortunately  here, the CofA held against Mr. Tucker. On the the bright side, that is one less  DA in the world.
People v. McBride        Closing  Argument and Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Conviction Reversed (Attempted Murder  Count)         
The CofA  reversed Mr. McBride's convictions for attempted first degree murder and first  degree assault.  
Here is  how the CofA outlined the prosecutor's egregious behaviour:
A. The flagrant  improprieties
            1. Accusing defendant of having  “lied over and over”
            2. Inflammatory appeals to jury  emotions
                        a. Calling defendant a  “coward”
b. Personal attacks on the defense  expert
c. Exhortations to “do justice” for  “strangers”
            3. Misstating the presumption of  innocence
            4. Distorting a key element of  attempted first degree murder
-           The CofA  found the yellow-light analogy of whether to stop or go through inapt, and  specifically found such an analogy blurred the line between impulsive acts, and  acts done after deliberation.
B. Prejudice – the CofA reasoned:  
“First, the types of improper arguments  made here threaten a defendant's right to a fair trial. The arguments not only  were replete with long discredited “liar” arguments and highly inflammatory  personal attacks but also employed a one second-yellow-light analogy that  eviscerated a key legal element. Second, the improprieties were pervasive. They  were even more wide-ranging in kind and degree than those in prior cases finding  reversible and plain error, respectively. Third, the defense did nothing to  invite the attacks. The “invited response” doctrine does not “license” improper  arguments but can help gauge whether
“taken in context, [the arguments]  unfairly prejudiced the defendant.””
People v. O'Neal    Statutory  Construction
Conviction Affirmed         
A jury  convicted Mr. O'Neal of possession of a weapon by a previous offender. The issue  on appeal was the inoperable gun Mr. O'Neal possessed when he was harassed by  the cops. The CofA held, regardless of operability, if the weapon is a firearm,  a conviction can be sustained under the statute.
People v. Riley    Self-Defense and  Multiple Assailants
Conviciton Affirmed             
A jury  convicted Mr. Riley of attempted reckless  manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence. The issue  was whether the trial court instructed the jury properly on self-defense and  multiple assailants. The CofA held it did not, but found the error to be  harmless.
People v. Tillery    SAC / Position of  Trust / Double Jeopardy / Prosecutorial Misconduct / Illegal  Sentences
Conviction Affirmed         
 Of significance, the CofA held the 60 year floor on an  indeterminate sentence to be illegal because the trial court had no such  authority to set just a high floor on an indeterminate sentence. The trial court  can only set a floor between the minimum in the presumptive range to twice the  maximum of the presumptive range. 
I lifed the remaining synopsis from the  syllabus.
The Court of Appeals, Webb, J.,  held
that:
(1)  evidence of  other acts of sexual contact was admissible as evidence of a pattern of sexual  assault against same victim;
(2)  forensic  interviewer's recorded statements did not impermissibly vouch for victim's  credibility; 
(3)  trial court  acted within its discretion in denying mistrial after victim testified about a  previously undisclosed sexual contact with defendant;
(4)  prosecutor's  improper closing comments that defendant lied were not plain  error;
(5)  the pattern  and POT convictions were based on unanimous jury findings;
(6)  on issue of  first impression, unpreserved double jeopardy claim involving alleged sentencing  error would be reviewed  for plain error;
(7) imposition of separate sentences  for the pattern and POT convictions did not violate double  jeopardy;
(8) sentence for each SAOC offense  could be enhanced based on evidence of pattern acts; and
(9) imposition of a lower term of 60  years for indeterminate life sentences exceeded what was authorized by  law.
People v. Villa         SAC /  Confrontation and Rape Shield / Equal Protection and Rape Sheild / 404(b) /  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Conviction Affirmed
Lifted from the syllabus
The Court of Appeals, Graham, J., held
(1) evidence of defendant's prior sexual assaults on another child was admissible to prove intent;
(2) rape shield statute does not violate a defendant's right to fully confront and cross-examine an accuser;
(3) on issue of first impression, rape shield statute does not violate equal protection;
(4) evidence that a different uncle previously had raped the other child who testified as to other crimes evidence was inadmissible under rape shield law exceptions;
(5) any misstatement in prosecutor's closing argument about the presumption of innocence was not plain error.
Conviction Affirmed
Lifted from the syllabus
The Court of Appeals, Graham, J., held
(1) evidence of defendant's prior sexual assaults on another child was admissible to prove intent;
(2) rape shield statute does not violate a defendant's right to fully confront and cross-examine an accuser;
(3) on issue of first impression, rape shield statute does not violate equal protection;
(4) evidence that a different uncle previously had raped the other child who testified as to other crimes evidence was inadmissible under rape shield law exceptions;
(5) any misstatement in prosecutor's closing argument about the presumption of innocence was not plain error.
 
 
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