U.S. Supreme Court 4-4-11 criminal law decision

Cullen v. Pinholster     Death Penalty Law / Habeas Corpus / Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of  1996  (AEDPA) / Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Facts: A jury in California convicted Mr. Pinholster of murder where he and his cohorts robbed and killed a drug dealer. The prosecution sought and the jury imposed the death penalty. However, three weeks prior to the life/sentencing phase trial, the sentencing attorney sought and obtained an evaluation from a doctor who found that Mr. Pinholster suffered only anti-social personality disorder and no other mental illness. The attorney did not provide the doctor with documentation of the years of abuse Mr. Pinholster suffered since he was a small child. Further, seemingly the doctor did not know the young Mr. Pinholster was in and out of institutions until he was 10 as a result of mental health issues. From age 10 on, Mr. Pinholster had been institutionalized – first in a mental hospital and then when they folded their hands and gave up, the state conjured up some juvenile charges, and the boy then was incarcerated in the juvenile prison system in California. According to his brother, Mr. Pinholster hardly had anytime, since age 10, outside an institution. None of this was brought to the jury’s attention. The sentencing phase lawyer only called Mr. Pinholster’s mother who did him no favors – she minimized his abuse and the institutional periods, and claimed all her kids were good kids. According to Justice Sotomayor, the mother did not testify in defense of Mr. Pinholster, but instead defended her piss poor parenting skills. Thus, not surprisingly, the jury sentenced Mr. Pinholster to death.

            At the 35(c) hearing in state court, the attorneys did not show all the evidence that the Federal District Court heard at a habeas corpus hearing. At the hearing in Federal court Mr. Pinholster’s attorneys called additional experts to refute the original doctor who found Mr. Pinholster suffered only antisocial personality disorder. The state claimed the Federal District Court could only base its decision on the evidence heard in the state proceeding.

Issue: Under the AEDPA rules constricting habeas proceedings, whether the Federal District Court is limited to only the record from the state post-conviction proceeding?

Held: Yes.

Reasoning: The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority, held that the rules governing habeas relief limit the Federal court. The rules state the court may overturn a post-conviction finding if the lower court finding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by  the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable  determination of the facts  in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Thus, the Court held this limits the Federal court solely to the record of the state court proceeding. Interestingly, Justice Alito dissented from this portion of the Court's holding.

Issue: Based upon the record in the state court, whether Mr. Pinholster received ineffective assistance of counsel?

Held: No

Reasoning: The Court simply ignored evidenced that most likely would have saved Mr. Pinholster’s life  - evidence his lawyers failed to present to the jury. Thus, the Court held Mr. Pinholster’s original trial lawyers effectively represented him.  Further, assuming Mr. Pinholster’s lawyer was ineffective, the Court nevertheless held such ineffectiveness did not prejudice Mr. Pinholster. Put simply, the Court reweighed the same evidence presented to the jury, ignored the other evidence presented in Federal Court, and found that the jury would not have granted Mr. Pinholster mercy. Justice Sotomayor wrote the dissent, and scathingly and convincingly argued for a new sentencing trial. 

United States Supreme Court criminal law related decision 3-29-11

Connick v. Thompson                        Brady Violation / Liability

Facts: Louisiana convicted Mr. Thompson of armed robbery in one case, murder in another case, and sought and obtained a death sentence against him. The same District Attorney assigned the same lead DA to each case along with 2 other Assistant DA’s. In the armed robbery, the assailant supposedly bled on the pant leg of one of the witnesses. The prosecution then sought testing of that swatch from the pant leg for blood type, which came out to be Type B. Mr. Thompson’s blood is Type O. Here is how Justice Ginsburg told the facts:

“Second, Dubelier or Whittaker ordered the crime laboratory to rush a pretrial test of the swatch.  Tr. 952–954. Whittaker received the lab report, addressed to his attention, two days before trial commenced.  Immediately thereafter, he placed the lab report on Williams’ desk. Record EX151, EX589.  Although the lab report conclusively identified the perpetrator’s blood type,  id., at EX151, the District Attorney’s Office never revealed the report to the defense.⁶ Third, Deegan checked the swatch out of the property room on the morning of the first day of trial, but the prosecution did not produce the swatch at trial.   Id., at X43.  Deegan did not return the swatch to the property room after trial, and the swatch has never been found.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 37.”

To recite all the prosecutorial misconduct here, would be just to recite the entire record. However, the prosecution then sought perjured testimony from another suspect who matched the description of the murder suspect  (Thompson did not). The prosecution did not disclose other exculpatory evidence, fought the defense’s efforts to force disclosure at every turn, and continued to fight disclosure long after the conviction was final. Shortly before Mr. Thompson’s scheduled execution, the defense found on microfiche the original results from the testing of the blood on the swatch from the pant leg. Based upon that, the court threw out the armed robbery conviction, an appellate court reversed his murder conviction and death sentence, and at a later trial, a jury found Mr. Thompson not guilty of murder.

Issue: Whether a prosecutor and his office may be liable for Brady violations that result in a death sentence and 18 years in prison, with 14 years of that sentence on death row?

Held: No.

Reasoning: In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court minimized the violation as one isolated incident, and found the prosecution could not be liable.  Justice Ginsburg thoroughly eviscerates the majority opinion, and shows clearly that this was not an isolated incident, but a concerted effort to convict and kill an innocent man.  Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.