Colorado Supreme Court 2-13-12 criminal law decision - Montez v. People

Montez v. People       1˚ Burglary / Deadly Weapon – ‘used or intended to be used’

Facts:   Phelicia Kossie and I tried Mr. Montez's case together – escape, burglary, and habitual offender counts (4 x the maximum presumptive range). The jury walked Mr. Montez on the escape (ISP Parole case - he cut off his bracelet; cops arrested him in Lakewood; and the jury found that Mr. Montez never left the area of his extended confinement - the Denver Metro Area). However, the jury convicted Mr. Montez of 1˚ degree burglary and the habitual counts. Mr. Montez, according to the evidence, broke into a home and stole a gun case with two guns in the case. Quickly after the break-in, police arrested the hapless Mr. Montez as he walked down the street with the gun case in tow. Mr. Montez never used or threatened to use the guns, and the prosecution never alleged such.

Issue:   Whether simply stealing guns amounts to using a deadly weapon during burglary?

Held:   No.

Reasoning:   Prior to 1981, Colorado Supreme Court precedent held that a firearm qualifies as a ‘per se deadly weapon’. Thus, under this prior precedent, simply stealing guns in a burglary would bump the burglary up from a 2˚ burglary, a class 4 felony, to 1˚ burglary, a class 3 felony. However, in 1981 the legislature changed the statute. The legislature wrote the statute to remove any possible reading of ‘per se deadly weapon’. The statutory change essentially overruled the Colorado Supreme Court’s prior precedent. Under the current statute to qualify as using a deadly weapon during the commission of the burglary, the accused must use or intended to use the firearm – not simply possess or steal.  Thus, here in Mr. Montez’s case, the Colorado Supreme Court held the statutory change back in 1981 specifically excluded scenarios where someone simply stole guns during a burglary. Elizabeth Griffin in the Appellate Division of the Colorado Public Defender’s Office did a helluva job, both in the Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court. Instead of dying in prison, Ms. Griffin gave Mr. Montez a chance of seeing daylight.

>Link to Montez v. People<

United States Supreme Court decision - Reynolds v. United States - Sex Offender Registration

Reynolds v. United States            Federal Sex Offender Registration

Facts:            Mr. Reynolds served prison time for a sex offense in Missouri from 2001. After Missouri released him, he moved to Pennsylvania. The Government claimed he did not give notice to Missouri of his change in residence, a violation of federal statute. Subsequent to his conviction, Congress passed its latest version of the sex offender registration statute. Never one to miss a chance at being petty, the government indicted Mr. Reynolds for not telling Missouri where he moved.

Issue: Whether the latest version of the federal sex offender registration statute applied people convicted prior to the statute’s enactment?

Held: No.

Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the Act does not apply to anyone convicted prior to its enactment until the Attorney General so specifies. At the time, the Attorney General had yet to specify the statute applied to folks like Mr. Reynolds. 
Link to Reynolds v. United States here